effect that sanctions have on bilateral trade flows has received relatively little attention in recent years, despite significant advances in the analytical toolkit commonly applied to this type of research. Moreover, most economic sanction studies only assess the impact of sanctions actually imposed (Lacy & Niou 2004) , thereby ignoring how threatening to impose sanctions may alter economic agents' actions.
This chapter measures the impact of sanction threats, in additional to sanction impositions, on bilateral trade flows. We show that threats, while often much discussed in media and causing uncertainty to economic agents, do not have a significant impact on international trade. Sanctions, once imposed, do have a detrimental effect on international trade, but the magnitude of these effects is a fraction of what has been documented in the literature.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 surveys the literature on the impact of economic sanctions on international trade. Recent improvements to the gravity model of international trade are reviewed in Section 3, along with details of our empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the results and sensitivity analyses. Section 5 discusses our key findings and concludes with pointers for future research. Morgan et al. (2014, p. 2) define economic sanctions as "actions that one or more countries take to limit or end their economic relations with a target country in an effort to persuade that country to change its policies." Therefore, a sanction must (a) involve one or more sender states and a target state and (b) be implemented by the sender(s) in order to change the behavior of the target state.
Literature
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Economic sanctions are built upon two basic premises ( Van Bergeijk 2009) . First, sanctions are meant to deprive the target country of (part of) the gains it experiences from international trade and investment. Second, this (threat of) disutility will affect the target's behavior. In other words, economic sanctions reduce welfare in the target country in order to force a change in its behavior. Sanctions can take many forms: tariffs, export controls, embargoes, import bans, travel bans, freezing assets, cutting aid, and blockades; all of which (with the exception of blockages) being legal barriers to trade.
Roughly three categories of sanctions can be discerned: boycotts, embargoes and financial sanctions (Barber 1979; Caruso 2003) . A boycott is a restriction of imports of one or more goods from the target country. It is meant to lower demand for the product from the target country. In addition, the import restriction attempts to reduce the foreign exchange earnings of the target country and thus its ability to purchase goods in international markets.
These measures are usually deemed ineffective because of the ease with which target countries can circumvent the import restrictions by finding other trading partners or setting up triangular schemes to sell their products.
A sender country may also restrict its own exports to a target country, which is called an embargo. These exports often comprise goods that are of strategic importance to the target country. An example is the 2014 situation in Ukraine, which led to the European Union restricting the export of arms and related materials, technology for military use, energyrelated equipment and technology, and oil exploration services to Russia (EU 2015) . Financial sanctions are meant to cut off lending and investment in the target country through the international credit markets, but also to freeze the target country's foreign assets. sanctions are a constant subject of debate (Kaempfer & Lowenberg 1988) . Likewise, sanctions have been subject to a rich literature of scientific inquiry owing to the mixed findings as to their effectiveness in yielding the "desired" outcomes (see, e.g., Van Bergeijk 1989; Hufbauer et al. 1990; Pape 1997; Drezner 2000) .
Datasets on sanctions
Research on economic sanctions has progressed significantly ever since Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott published their work and corresponding dataset (hereafter referred to as HSE) in 1990.
Prior to their research, most work focused on a single sanction case and tried to explain why sanctions did and could not work (Galtung 1967; Hoffman 1967; Baer 1973; Schreiber 1973; Olson 1979; von Amerongen 1980; Wallensteen 1983) .
Since the release of HSE, research has explored the effects of economic sanctions on foreign direct investment (Biglaiser & Lektzian 2011) , human rights (Peksen 2009 ), the level of democracy (Peksen et al. 2010) , jobs and wages (Hufbauer et al. 1997) , along with the impact that sanctions have on international trade (Caruso 2003) . A related line of inquiry deals with third-country effects or sanctions busting, i.e., the situation in which a sanctioned state reroutes its trade to other trading partners that are not taking part in the sanctioning of the aforementioned state, thus eliminating the effect of the sanction (Early 2009; Yang et al. 2009 ).
In 2006, Morgan et al. introduced their dataset on economic sanctions called Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (hereafter referred to as TIES). In their companion paper, they state that "in order to continue to advance our understanding of economic sanctions by testing hypotheses derived from recent theory, new data are needed" (Morgan et al. 2009, p. 93) .
The largest advantage of the TIES dataset is that it contains far more cases than the HSE dataset. This suggests that the use of this new dataset might very well change what is currently understood about the impacts of economic sanctions ). For example, research conducted using TIES has given valuable new insights into multilateral sanctions. When using the TIES dataset, found that, in contrast to the results that were produced with the HSE dataset, multilateral sanctions are more effective than unilateral sanctions. Theory suggested this outcome long before the TIES dataset was created, however, it could not be proved with the HSE dataset.
A comparison of both datasets reveals that the TIES dataset has several advantages over the HSE dataset. TIES contains far more cases than HSE-1,412 compared to 204-and it includes information about sanction threats as well (of the 1,412 cases, 567 cases constitute threats and 845 are impositions. In HSE, all 204 cases refer to impositions only.) Also, the US is the primary sender in 60% of the cases in HSE, compared to 48% in TIES. This means that HSE is more biased towards the US than TIES. Moreover, the mean duration of the cases in TIES is far shorter (2.43 years) than those in HSE (6.6 years), which indicates that HSE severely underestimates the number of relatively short sanction episodes.
Effects of imposed sanctions on international trade
For the purpose of this chapter, impact is defined as the change in bilateral trade flows brought on by the threat or imposition of an economic sanction. The gravity model of international trade has long been used to by international economists to empirically examine the determinants of bilateral trade flows (Tinbergen 1962 Hufbauer et al. (1997) and Caruso (2003) delved into the impact that economic sanctions have on international trade by applying a gravity model. Hufbauer et al. (1997) contemporaneously searched for effects on jobs and wages. Yang et al. (2004) (Elliott & Hufbauer 1999; Caruso 2003; Wood 2008; Peksen 2009 ). Hufbauer et al. (1997) show that extensive U.S. sanctions can reduce bilateral trade by up to 90%. The results on limited and moderate sanctions are not as robust as the results on extensive sanctions, but they
show an average reduction of about 30%.
In his work, Caruso (2003) Table 1 provides an overview of the main results so far that are relevant for this literature review. Limited/moderate sanctions typically include partial economic embargoes, import restrictions, export restrictions, the termination of foreign aid, and travel bans. Examples of extensive sanctions include total economic embargoes, blockades, asset freezes, suspension of economic agreements, and composite sanctions combining several types of sanctions.
Effects of sanction threats on international trade
A phenomenon that scholars are only able to research relatively recently is economic sanction threats. The imposition of economic sanctions has been widely researched for decades, however; only since the inception of the TIES dataset there is data available on sanction threats. Because of data restrictions, authors chose to focus on a single case such as the U.S.
threatening to sanction China because of the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 (Li & Drury, 2004; Drury & Li, 2006) . Sanction threat cases are situations in which a sender state threatens to implement sanctions against a target state if the target does not comply with the sender's demands. Usually these demands, much like an imposition case, entail policy changes or a different standpoint in a political matter.
The question when it comes to sanction threats so far has been whether threats are as effective as sanction impositions. Most recent research focused on this question and looked solely at the effectiveness of threats (Lacy & Niou 2004; Drury & Li 2006) . A threat is effective when the outcome of the threat case is equal to the desired outcome. Therefore, effectiveness is more concerned with success rates of changing policy, rather than the economic consequence (i.e. change in trade flows).
To our knowledge, the impact that sanction threats might have on trade flows has not yet been examined empirically. One of the few papers offering theoretical guidance in this regard is by Lacy & Niou (2004) , who present their model as a multistage game of two-sided incomplete information between a sender and a target. The authors state that the threat stage of a case is critical to understanding the outcome of the sanction. "The model reveals that the threat of sanctions can be as potent a policy tool as the imposition of sanctions" (Lacy & Niou 2004, p. 38) . This chapter suggests that threats are just as capable of changing a target's behavior as actual impositions.
Regarding the impact of sanction threats, two scenarios are possible. Let us assume that the government of the sender state has become displeased with the policies adopted by the target. The sender threatens to impose economic sanctions on the target. Firms in these states witness the struggle their governments are in and act according to what they deem fit. In both scenarios firms expect an economic sanction to follow the sanction threat. However, it is the reaction to the threat that differs in each scenario. In the first scenario, firms expect a sanction episode and anticipate this by pulling out of deals with firms in the target. This line of events would impact negatively on the countries' bilateral trade flows. The alternative scenario expects firms to expedite business deals with firms in the target state in order to fully reap the benefits of trade 'while they still can'. In this situation, a rise in trade between sender and target should be witnessed.
Looking at it this way, it becomes clear that a threat case is significantly different from a case in which a sender actually imposes a sanction on a target, since there is no definite
harm done yet. Until now, this aspect of sanction threats has not been tested. We therefore use the TIES dataset to empirically determine how threatening to impose economic sanctions affect international trade.
Methodology
Gravity Model
For the purposes of this chapter, we follow the literature by applying a gravity equation of international trade. The basic gravity model explains bilateral trade flows by using a loglinear equation:
(1) ln TRADEijt = β0 + β1 ln GDPit + β2 ln GDPjt + β3 ln DISTANCEij + β4 TAijt + β5 THREATijt + β6 IMPOSITIONijt + eijt where TRADEijt denotes bilateral trade between state i and state j at time t, GDPit and GDPjt represent their gross domestic products respectively, and DISTANCEij the physical distance between states. TAijt is a binary variable which is 1 if both countries in a given dyad-year have a trade agreement and 0 otherwise. THREATijt is a binary variable that takes the value 1 when a sanction threat is active between countries i and j in year t, and 0 if not. The same goes for IMPOSITIONijt, however in this case it involves a sanction imposition. eijt is the random error term.
To date, empirical analyses on the trade impacts of sanctions have relied on this very basic version of the gravity equation (Hufbauer et al. 1990; Caruso, 2003; Yang et al. 2004 ).
However, the gravity equation has since then undergone several significant improvements (for an overview of how the methodology has evolved, see Kohl 2014) . We estimate equation (4) and (5) Armed with these latest advances from the gravity literature, our empirical strategy adds to the literature a model that incorporates time-varying multilateral resistance terms, controls for potential endogeneity bias, and accounts for zero trade flows.
Data
The "Limited/moderate" threats and impositions refer to events when governments threated to impose, or factually imposed, partial economic embargoes, import restrictions, export restrictions, terminate foreign aid, or travel bans. We consider "Extensive" threats/impositions to include total economic embargoes, asset freezes, suspension of economic agreements/protocols, and multiple types/cased in a given year (based on the authors' calculations). Note that TIES also identifies a few threats/impositions as "other", which were recoded to "missing" so as to be entirely excluded from our analysis. Note that estimating regressions for specific types of threats and impositions is inadvisable due to large asymmetries in the number of observations per type of threat or imposition. For example, we only observe 6 (29) times that a sender has threatened to free assets (impose travel bans), while threats to impose import restrictions (terminate foreign aid) were observed 900 (1492) times.
Results
The main results are reported in A possible limitation to our first specification is that our data are on an annual basis, but that threats and impositions could easily occur in the same year. We therefore deem it sensible to include an interaction term so that we can isolate for a given year the effect of threats only, impositions only, and threats in combination with impositions.
As reported in column 2, the interaction term is negative -suggesting that threats followed by impositions in the same year have a negative effect on trade -but the parameter estimate is not statistically significant.
What about sanctions which were only imposed in the year following a sanction threat? We construct a binary indicator variable to account for such cases. Similar to column 2, the coefficient in column 3 shows that threats followed by impositions in the subsequent year also have a negative trade impact, albeit not significant.
As discussed above, a main drawback of equation 2 is that the set of fixed effects does not properly account for time-varying multilateral resistance terms and neither does it control for potential endogeneity bias. The remainder of Table 3 Two main preliminary conclusions can be drawn from Table 3 . First, earlier estimates of how sanctions affect international trade are overestimated. We find that the effect of sanctions (impositions) on trade is about -20%, around a fifth of the estimate typically found in the literature. In our view, this difference is due to the substantial coverage of sanctions in the TIES dataset (compared to the HSE dataset) and our theoretically consistent specification of the gravity equation with time-varying multilateral resistance terms and country-pair fixed effects to control for endogeneity bias. Second, while sender states' threats to impose sanctions could have an economic impact on trade, this positive effect only materializes if sanctions are imposed. Threats alone are of no significant consequence for trade.
To further understand how threats and impositions affect trade, we now proceed to distinguish various types of threats and impositions. The setup of Table 4 . is exactly the same as Table 4 sheds some light on how the extensiveness of a sanction (threat) affects trade. For example, the point estimates for extensive threats tend to be smaller (negative) than those of limited/moderate threats (while not being significant). Columns 4-6 also show that extensive impositions have the largest negative (and significant) effect on trade, compared to impositions that are of a limited/moderate nature.
As with Table 3 , inclusion of the interaction terms suggests that trade responds more negatively to sanctions which were only implemented without preceding threats, compared to threats which led to sanction impositions. Yet, in contrast to Table 3 
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The results for this one, single regression are presented in Table 5 for OLS, and Table 6 for PPML. Note that for each table, column 2-6 provides the parameter estimates of THREAT, IMPOSITION and the interaction terms which all have been lagged by 1-5 years. Strikingly, while the bulk of the parameter estimates have the expected (negative) sign, they tend to be small on average and not statistically significant. Re-estimating our models after excluding the top-5 senders (i.e. United Stated, Canada, Russia United Kingdom and India) from the sample, or by excluding all senders except the top-5 senders, does not give rise to substantially different results (not reported for brevity).
Discussion and Conclusion
We set out to answer whether results from earlier economic sanction research stood the test of time, since developments in the field have been numerous in recent years. By including an extensive dataset on sanctions-both threats and impositions-and employing a theoretically consistent gravity equation, we find that sanctions are hardly as harmful as indicated in the previous literature. Where Hufbauer et al. (1997 ), Caruso (2003 , and Yang et al. (2004) found results of up to 90% decreases in bilateral trade, our findings suggest -if anything -a reduction of around 20% owing to greater data coverage and improvements in the econometric strategy.
From our results, it follows that there is a difference between threatening to sanction a target state and actually sanctioning said state. Threats alone do not affect trade, while actual impositions decrease trade. The rich nature of the sanctions dataset provided by Morgan et al. (2014) provides several ways to further explore how sanction mechanisms may be effective in altering modes of international exchange. We now highlight several such avenues for future research.
A topic that has fallen outside the scope of this chapter but generated mixed results in the past is unilateral versus multilateral sanctions. Elliott et al. (2008) found that multilateral sanctions were less effective than unilateral sanctions, yet this result is counteractive and contrasts sharply with work by . Caruso (2003) found no significant difference in impact between unilateral and multilateral sanctions. An application with a stateof-the-art gravity equation is advisable.
Our findings do not indicate an impact of sanction threats on international trade. To some extent, we have argued that there could be good reasons to expect that markets anticipate future changes in trade policy and respond immediately when threats are issued.
However, threats are not issued in a vacuum, and having a better understanding of the context may be important to capture the pure effect of sanction threats on trade. For example, media coverage of the Crimea crisis was so extensive, and the event so significant, that it should not seem surprising that many observers expected the EU and US to impose sanctions even before the respective governments formally announced that they would consider imposing sanctions on Russia. Yet in other cases, a government's announced threats may be less expected, even if only due to limited media coverage. Therefore, a refined measure on media coverage of events leading to sanctions being threatened with and/or imposed, combined with novel measures of economic uncertainty (see Baker, Bloom and Davis, 2016) could improve the empirical setup employed in this chapter.
Another avenue for further research is to use monthly trade data and/or product-level data, rather than the annual aggregate data used in this chapter. The TIES dataset is sufficiently rich to explore the impact of sanctions on a product level, yet such a project would be very data intensive. Furthermore, monthly data could provide a more fine-grained picture of how trade responds to announced threats and news of sanctions actually imposed.
One more issue that deserves further attention is the period following a sanction episode. We know that impositions decrease trade, but what happens when the sanctions are lifted? It would be interesting to find out how long it takes before trade returns to the level from before the episode to determine whether there is a so-called 'rebound effect'. Perhaps trade does not recover for a longer period after the sanctions are already lifted; this would mean that the damage done by sanctions may be more substantial than we expect.
While research has studied the effect of sanctions on international trade, sanction data call into question whether impact studies should mainly be concerned with international trade flows. Travel bans, asset freezes and cuts in foreign aid, for instance, may be more important for foreign direct investment (FDI) than for international trade. As data quality on bilateral Yang et al. (2004) Years studied 1985, 1990, 1995 1960-2000 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995 
